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In the end, nothing was done. The reports of the Pahlen investigation were 
printed in massive volumes and then, like the reports of many a previous 
enquiry, were forgotten.1
The report of the Commission for the Inspection of the Turkestan region 
led by Senator Count Konstantin Konstantinovich von der Pahlen (1861–1923) 
was frequently cited in the publications of the first generation of western his-
torians to work on pre-revolutionary Russian Central Asia.2 As Richard Pierce 
noted, whilst at the time the Pahlen Commission’s one-year tour of inspection 
from June 1908–1909, together with the immense labor of writing, collating and 
correcting the twenty-three volumes of its report, might have been an exercise 
in futility, the latter later became a gold-mine of information for historians ex-
cluded from Soviet archives in Russia and Uzbekistan. Combined with Pahlen’s 
lively memoirs, composed in exile in 1922 in his native German and published 
and translated in 1964, the Pahlen Report was the single most important source 
for the administrative structures and economy of the Russian Empire’s most 
colonial periphery, namely Turkestan. The importance we should attach to this 
  This article was originally delivered as a paper at the Central Asian Sources Seminar of 
Kyoto University for Foreign Studies. My thanks to Professor Yoichi Yajima for the invita-
tion, and likewise to Professors Isogai Ken’ichi and Uyama Tomohiko and the reviewers of 
Acta Slavica Iaponica for their questions and comments.
 1 Richard A. Pierce, “Introduction,” Konstantin K. Pahlen, Mission to Turkestan: Being the 
Memoirs of Count K. K. Pahlen 1908–1909, Trans. N. J. Couriss (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1964), p. xii.
 2 Before the collapse of the USSR seriously-researched work by Western scholars on colonial 
Turkestan was not extensive: apart from Pierce’s own monograph, Richard Pierce, Russian 
Central Asia 1867–1917: A Study in Colonial Rule (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1960), the most valuable contributions were Seymour Becker, Russia’s Protectorates 
in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva 1865–1924 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1968); articles by Ian Murray Matley in Edward Allworth, ed., Central Asia, a Century of 
Russian Rule (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967); David Mackenzie, “Turkes-
tan’s Significance to Russia 1850–1917,” Russian Review 35 (1974), pp. 167–188; D. S. M. Wil-
liams, “Land Reform in Turkestan,” Slavonic & East European Review 51:124 (July 1973), pp. 
428–438; Idem, “Fiscal Reform in Turkestan,” Slavonic & East European Review 52:128 (July 
1974), pp. 382–392.
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text today, twenty years since the beginning of the “archival revolution” and 
the “imperial turn” in the study of Russian history, is less clear.3 As a report 
which was, in large part, never acted on, the Pahlen Commission’s findings 
might be able to tell us about where Russian rule in Turkestan had arrived 
by 1908, but supposedly offer few clues to the trajectory of official politics in 
the last, fateful decade of Russian colonial rule before it was first rocked and 
then destroyed by the events of 1916–17. Large parts of the report were based 
upon earlier publications, in particular the posthumously-published Proekt for 
a new Turkestan statute of the first Governor-General, Konstantin Petrovich 
von Kaufman (1818–1882), the earlier one-volume report on Turkestan drawn 
up by senator F. K. Giers (1824–1891) in 1884, and works of the statistical com-
mittees in Samarkand, Syr-Darya and Ferghana Provinces;4 one leading Rus-
sian historian of Central Asia has gone so far as to refer to it as no more than 
a “secondary source.”5 Pahlen himself was not an old Turkestan hand – that, 
indeed, seems to have been precisely why he was chosen for the task of clean-
ing up what was supposed to be a particularly corrupt periphery of the empire, 
run by a coterie of vested military-bureaucratic interests.6 The members of his 
commission were equally outsiders with little local knowledge, drawn largely 
from the Imperial Senate and from the Ministry of Justice, and he himself de-
scribed with some amusement the effects of travelling away from the line of 
rail in Turkestan on some of the more exquisite members of his entourage.7 
The Inspection was often criticized in both the metropolitan and the Turke-
stan Press at the time, not so much because people doubted the truth about 
the many cases of criminality and corruption which it uncovered, but because 
even sympathetic commentators thought it had insufficient human resources 
at its disposal to cleanse the “Augean Stables” of Turkestan, and would be 
 3 Michael David-Fox, Peter Holquist & Alexander M. Martin, “The Imperial Turn,” Kritika 
7:4 (Fall 2006), pp. 705–712.
 4 Gen.-Ad’t. K. P. fon-Kaufman, Proekt vsepoddanneishego otcheta Gen.-Ad’iutanta fon-Kaufma-
na po grazhdanskomu upravleniiu (St. Pb.: Voennaia Tip., 1885); F. K. Girs, Otchet, revizuiu-
shchago, po vysochashemu poveleniiu, Turkestanskogo kraia, tainogo sovetnika Girsa (St. Pb.: n.p., 
1884); Sbornik materialov dlia statistiki Syr-Dar’inskoi oblasti (Tashkent: Syr-Dar’inskii oblast-
noi Statisticheskii Komitet, 1891–1907); Spravochnaia knizhka Samarkandskoi oblasti Vyp. I–X 
(Samarkand: Izdanie Samarkandskogo Oblastnogo Statisticheskoga Komiteta, 1893–1912); 
Ezhegodnik Ferganskoi oblasti Vyp. I–III (Novyi Margelan: Izdanie Ferganskogo Oblastnogo 
Statisticheskago Upravleniia, 1902–04).
 5 Sergei Abashin, personal communication. See also his review of A. S. Morrison, Russian 
Rule in Samarkand 1868–1910: A Comparison with British India (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008) in Ab Imperio 2 (2009), pp. 380–386.
 6 A. Sh., “Reviziia Turkestanskogo kraia,” Novoe Vremia 11762 (1908) in Turkestanskii sbornik 
[TS] 494, p. 171; beyond this it is hard to say specifically why Pahlen was chosen to conduct 
the inspection, beyond his obvious credentials as the son of a former Minister of Justice and 
pillar of the Baltic German aristocracy. 
 7 Pahlen, Mission to Turkestan, p. 198.
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dependent on local cooperation to have any effect.8 More hostile press cover-
age criticized its immense cost, and argued that insufficient local expertise was 
being brought to bear, whilst the few months which Pahlen and the members 
of his commission spent in Turkestan in 1908–09 were hardly sufficient to give 
them more than the most superficial impressions of such a vast and complex 
region.9 Under such circumstances, could the report really be anything more 
than a baggy compilation of received wisdom, prejudice, and ignorance? It 
could be argued that either Pahlen and the members of his Commission would 
simply accept what they were told and what they read, or – given that they 
were sent to Turkestan to fulfill a particular “reforming” agenda set by St Pe-
tersburg – that they would treat everything they found with suspicion and 
contempt. To this we can add the fact that – as Pierce had already recognized 
fifty years ago – Pahlen was a man of his time, more humane and honest than 
some, perhaps, but convinced of the necessity and rightness of colonialism, 
even as he uncovered the many cruelties and abuses it brought with it.10 His 
memoirs were written thirteen years after his last visit to Turkestan without 
the benefit of his notes, and contain numerous inaccuracies (he frequently con-
fused the Syr-Darya and Amu-Darya rivers, for instance), whilst also revealing 
some rather sinister beliefs about the superiority of the “Aryan” over the “Tur-
co-Mongol” races.11 If postcolonial discourse theorists urge us to discard even 
archival sources produced for internal purposes by the colonial state, then how 
much more should we distrust a text like the Pahlen Report, which, whilst it 
was not widely circulated, was very much a public document, produced with 
a particular audience in mind?
There is some truth in these criticisms: the shortcomings and blind spots in 
Pahlen’s understanding of Turkestan are seen most clearly in his Commission’s 
work on the narodnye sudy, or qazis, in Turkestan, and on Islamic and custom-
ary law in the region.12 These placed a very heavy emphasis on judicial cor-
ruption and arbitrariness, something Pahlen also referred to in his memoirs in 
the context of the unreformed judicial system in the protectorate of Bukhara.13 
However, what was perceived as “corruption” or criminal behavior by Pahlen 
and colonial officials seems to have had deep roots in local politics which we 
still do not properly understand, and in some cases may even have been a sub-
 8 Anon, “Avgievy koniushi,” Na rubezhe 19 (1908) in TS 494, pp. 23–25.
 9 See for instance P. Andreevich, “K revizii Turkestanskogo kraia,” Tashkentskii kur’er 10 
(1908), in TS 469, pp. 81–83; N. S., “Strana bezpraviia. Po Srednei Azii. Reviziia Grafa Pale-
na,” Vecher’ 379 (1909), in TS 516, pp. 13–14.
 10 Pierce, “Introduction,” p. xiv.
 11 See Pahlen, Mission to Turkestan, p. 52.
 12 Senator Gofmeister Graf K. K. Palen, Otchet po revizii Turkestanskago kraia, proizvedennoi po 
VYSOCHAISHEMU poveleniiu... (St. Pb.: Senatskaia Tipografiia, 1910), Vol. 14, Narodnye 
sudy Turkestanskago kraia, Vol. 19, Pravovoi byt tuzemnago naseleniia.
 13 Pahlen, Mission to Turkestan, pp. 76–77.
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tle means of resisting or undermining the colonial authorities. The reliability of 
the Pahlen Commission’s conclusions on these points is debatable, and I have 
not always been as conscientious as I should have been in questioning its as-
sumptions.14 The “colonial” nature of Pahlen’s thinking becomes still more ob-
vious when we consider his ambitious aim of creating a single, written shari’a 
code for the use of all qazis in Turkestan.15 This ended in fiasco, largely because 
Pahlen attempted to base his reform upon a code of Anglo-Muhammadan law 
used in British India, which proved quite unacceptable to local jurists.16 The 
failure of such a textbook attempt at the creation of “colonial knowledge” tells 
us a good deal about the limits of Russian power in Turkestan when compared 
to British India or French Algeria, and it also demonstrates how little Pahlen 
understood about certain aspects of Turkestan’s population and culture.17 
The Pahlen report certainly needs to be used with more caution than 
was employed by the earlier generation of historians who had little or nothing 
against which to test its assertions. Nevertheless, in my view it remains central 
to our understanding of the administrative framework of the Turkestanskii krai 
at the beginning of the twentieth century, as the single most comprehensive 
assessment of Russian colonialism by someone who was actually there, who 
toured the region and met many of the protagonists, but at the same time had 
no personal stake in the system and could view it with a certain degree of 
detachment. What is more, the opening up of former Soviet archives finally 
allows us to see the Pahlen report in its full political and bureaucratic context, 
to understand why the Commission was sent to Turkestan, how it gathered 
information, and how, and on the basis of what sources, the text of its report 
was put together. The Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Arkhiv in St Peters-
 14 In particular two reviewers of my own book have rightly pointed out that I often simply 
reproduced the language of Pahlen’s criticisms of corruption in the native administration 
of Turkestan, without reflecting on the degree to which this was simply a common trope 
of colonial administrators seeking to blame their own failings on their native subordinates. 
See Adeeb Khalid, “A. S. Morrison, Russian Rule in Samarkand 1868–1910: A Comparison with 
British India [Review],” Slavic Review 69:2 (Spring 2010), pp. 242–243; Jeff Sahadeo, “Visions 
of Empire. Russia’s Place in the Imperial World,” Kritika 11:2 (Spring 2010), pp. 398–399.
 15 See V. V. Bartol’d, “Istoriia kul’turnoi zhizni Turkestana,” Sochineniia Vol. II, Pt. 1 (Moscow: 
“Nauka,” 1963), pp. 386–388; Adeeb Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism 
in Central Asia (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998), pp. 70–71; Morrison, 
Russian Rule in Samarkand, pp. 274–282; Paolo Sartori, “An Overview of Tsarist Policy on 
Islamic Courts in Turkestan: Its Genealogy and Its Effects,” in S. Abashin & S. Gorshenina, 
eds., Cahiers d’Asie Centrale, Vol. 17/18, Le Turkestan Russe. Une colonie comme les autres? 
(Tashkent-Paris: IFEAC, 2009), pp. 492–494 for other discussions of this episode.
 16 This text was Sir Roland Knyvett Wilson, Anglo-Muhammadan Law: A Digest Preceded by a 
Historical and Descriptive Introduction of the Special Rules Now Applicable to Modern and An-
cient Authorities (London: Thacker, Spink & Co., 1903); Palen, Pravovoi Byt, pp. 10–11.
 17 I have explored this idea further in Alexander Morrison, “Applied Orientalism in Brit-
ish India and Tsarist Turkestan,” Comparative Studies in Society & History 51:3 (2009), pp. 
619–647.
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burg contains the Fond for the Pahlen Commission (all of which, to the best of 
my knowledge, is on microfilm) – possibly including the “notes and papers” 
which Pahlen thought he had lost when he fled St Petersburg after the October 
revolution.18 This contains copies of the publications used by the Commission, 
drafts of various volumes of the report (some of which differ quite substantially 
from the final, published versions) and, perhaps most importantly, original in-
formation collected by its members or submitted to the senator and his entou-
rage in 1908–09. These included numerous petitions from officials, “natives” 
– urban and rural, settled and nomadic – and from Russian peasant colonists, 
which are an important source in their own right.19 Comprehensive analysis of 
this material will allow us to understand which parts of the report are based 
on the Commission’s own research, which are recycled from earlier statistical 
and historical publications, what was suppressed and what was included, and 
which parts of the report were actually written by Pahlen himself. We are also 
fortunate to have the senator’s lively memoirs against which to compare this 
material and the text of the report, which adds another layer of possible analy-
sis, even if they are not uniformly reliable. 
Thus the Pahlen Commission’s work can now be examined from at least 
five different angles, each of which I will try to introduce in this article: we 
have the evidence of the report itself, of the documents which the Commis-
sion produced and collected and on which the report was partly based, of re-
cords from local archives in Central Asia from the period of the inspection 
and the years before, of Pahlen’s memoirs, and finally of the Press reaction, in 
Turkestan and the metropole, both to the Commission’s activities whilst it was 
in Central Asia, and to the publication of the report. Between them, I would 
argue, they give us a more vivid picture than any other source of the state of 
Turkestan’s administration in the early twentieth century, and through this, 
of many other aspects of the social, economic and political history of this still 
under-studied region.
The LocaL InsTITuTIonaL conTexT In TurkesTan
The Pahlen Commission and its report shed light on a turbulent and still 
poorly-understood period in Turkestan’s history. By the early 1900s the gen-
eration of officers which had administered the region since its conquest in the 
1860s had almost all retired or died off, and increasing peasant settlement and 
a cotton boom presented the threadbare apparatus of military government 
with new challenges with which it struggled to cope. Pahlen’s Commission 
of Inspection had been set up at short notice because of what appeared to be a 
 18 Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Arkhiv (RGIA), f. 1396 [Reviziia Senatora Palena 
K. K. Turkestanskogo Kraia v 1908–1910 gg.]; Pierce, “Introduction,” p. xiii.
 19 A selection of petitions received by the commission can be found transcribed at http://
zerrspiegel.orientphil.uni-halle.de/c5631.html (accessed 21/06/2011)
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crisis in Turkestan’s administration, triggered by the unexpected resignation of 
Governor-General N. I. Grodekov (1843–1913) in March 1908. This was only the 
latest such premature departure: Generals S. A. Dukhovskoi (1838–1901) and 
N. A. Ivanov (1842–1904) died in office, followed in 1905, after less than a year, 
by the easy-going General N. N. Tevyashev (1842–1905). In a region where 
the Governor-General had far more autonomy than in any internal province, 
and the administration was highly dependent on his personal grasp of affairs, 
this lack of continuity had serious consequences. As a pseudonymous corre-
spondent of the Kadet newspaper Rech’ (who went by the intriguing name of 
“Needle”) described it, it was at this stage that the state of affairs in Turkestan 
began to attract attention in St Petersburg. Tevyashev had been so ill that he 
not only failed to suppress revolutionary disturbances in Tashkent in 1905 but 
supposedly did not even notice they were happening, being quite happy to 
leave the running of the region to his head of Chancellery, G. P. Fedorov.20 The 
next Governor-General, D. I. Subotich (1852–1920), had then resigned after less 
than a year in office in order to become a member of the Voennyi Sovet in St 
Petersburg. Whilst Subotich (who was Serbian in origin) was darkly suspected 
of both cowardice and liberal tendencies by Turkestani officials,21 Grodekov’s 
apparent desertion of his post could not be explained in these terms. He was a 
quintessential old Turkestanets with a distinguished military record, a long-time 
Governor of the Syr-Darya Oblast’, and almost the last of the hallowed coterie 
who had served with von Kaufman. “Needle” attributed the departure of both 
Subotich and Grodekov to the overwhelming quantity of paperwork which 
the job now brought with it.22 A system of administration which relied on the 
Governor-General’s personal decision even for quite minor matters might have 
sufficed in the pioneering days of von Kaufman, but it was no longer adequate 
for a region whose society and economy were rapidly being transformed.23 
Pahlen was sent to Turkestan with a specific mandate, namely to exam-
ine the feasibility of extending civilian government and laws to the region in 
 20 Needle, “Senatorskaia reviziia Turkestana [24/12/1908],” Rech’ Nos. 6, 10, 13 (1909) in TS 
499, pp. 185–190; in his memoirs Fedorov described Teviashev’s illness and the delay in 
suppressing the disturbances in Tashkent, together with Subotich’s precipitate departure: 
G. P. Fedorov, “Moia sluzhba v Turkestanskom krae (1870–1910 goda),” Istoricheskii vestnik 
12 (1913), pp. 886–890.
 21 Turkestanets, “Iz istorii Turkestana,” Vecher’ 349 (1909) in TS 508, pp. 187–190.
 22 Needle, “Senatorskaia reviziia Turkestana,” Rech’ 6 (1909), p. 186.
 23 Senator Gofmeister Graf K. K. Palen, Otchet po revizii Turkestanskago kraia, proizvedennoi po 
VYSOCHAISHEMU poveleniiu..., Vol. 4, Kraevoe Upravlenie, pp. 101–115 lists numerous in-
stances of the petty matters the Governor-General was called upon to deal with personally, 
as well as the problems caused by the fact that the Military Governors of Provinces could 
deal directly with Ministries in St. Petersburg.
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order to integrate it more firmly into the Empire under a new statute.24 More 
specifically, perhaps his principal brief was to remove the obstacles which an 
outdated military bureaucracy was placing in the way of increased Russian col-
onization in the region, which was in fact the probable reason why Grodekov 
had been forced out.25 In the event, he would argue strongly against both: in-
stead Pahlen’s report advocated a curious mixture of legal rectitude, market 
forces and old-fashioned paternalism. He agreed that Turkestan’s governance 
needed to become less personalized and dependent on the Governor-General, 
and his proposed solutions to this included reforming the Governor-General’s 
Council, the introduction of civilian administration and a modified form of 
zemstvo, and the granting of greater responsibility to the District Officers (uezd-
nye nachal’niki) whose personal qualities he came to admire. The region as a 
whole, he argued, should be a “colony within the empire,” with greater devo-
lution of power and autonomy from the centre: this was the lesson which he 
learnt from examining the example of British India:
These insufficiencies present themselves especially clearly on comparison of 
our system for ruling the area with that of other Governments over Asiatic 
possessions, especially with the most prominent and extensive – the British 
Indian Colony. [...] Almost all the power, which in the inner Gubernii belongs 
to the Governors, is in fact appropriated by the Governor-General’s Chan-
cellery. All the Uezdnye Nachal’niki and Pristavy know that the most petty 
questions cannot be settled on their direct authority, but by the Governor-
General’s Chancellery, to which they also turn for all instruction and advice. 
In this way the entire extensive region, divided into five Oblasti, each of which 
could constitute a large Guberniia, in practice turns out to be just one vast 
administrative unity [...] and this situation presents itself particularly starkly 
when the powers of the head of the Turkestan Krai are compared with those 
of the Governor-General of India.26
This administrative anglophilia, combined as it was with what Peter 
Holquist has called “the old Russian liberal bureaucratic notion of an enlight-
ened, absolutist Rechtstaat” is reminiscent of the views of Boris Nolde, another 
Baltic German who wrote about the model of devolved power in British colo-
nies, and whose ideas may possibly have influenced Pahlen.27 To some extent 
 24 Pahlen’s official instructions were published locally as “Vysochaishe odobrennoe 18 iiunia 
1908 goda osoboe nastavlenie senatoru, naznachennomu po vysochaishemu poveleniiu k 
proizvodstvu revizii Turkestanskogo kraia,” Turkestanskiia vedomosti [TV] 153 (1908) in TS 
469, pp. 168–172.
 25 “K revizii Turkestanskogo kraia,” Tashkentskii kur’er 105 (1908) in TS 469, pp. 4–5; Daniel 
Brower, Turkestan and the Fate of the Russian Empire (London: Routledgecurzon, 2003), pp. 
140–143.
 26 “Kratkii vsepoddanneishii doklad K. K. Palena o revizii Turkestanskogo kaia. Chernovik,” 
(1909), RGIA, f. 1396, op. 1, d. 437, ll. 30–34, 43ob.
 27 B. E. Nol’de “Angliia i ee avtonomnye kolonii,” Vestnik Evropy 9 (1906), pp. 5–67, cited in 
Peter Holquist, “Dilemmas of a Progressive Administrator: Baron Boris Nolde,” Kritika 7:2 
(Spring 2006), pp. 244, 255.
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he too should be seen as a “liberal” bureaucrat, in the more limited, Russian 
sense of the term.28 From his own writings it is clear that what mattered most 
to him, as it did to many other Russian liberals, was an end to state arbitrari-
ness and the establishment of a firm rule of law, rather than any desire for 
more representative government.29 In some ways even this is unexpected: his 
father, Count Konstantin Ivanovich Pahlen (1833–1912), as Minister of Justice 
in the 1870s had tried (ineptly) to subordinate the newly-created independent 
judiciary to autocratic control.30 The younger Pahlen, by contrast, had argued 
strongly for an end to all Jewish legal disabilities when he was Governor of 
Vilna in 1902–05. The reasons for this difference in attitudes may have been 
no more than generational, and it did not make him particularly responsive to 
popular demands or needs, but equally it ensured that he deplored and sought 
to halt the way in which some officials and organs of the state rode rough-shod 
over legal norms, whether these comprised Islamic law and local custom (as he 
saw them), formal legislation, or administrative regulations. As we shall see, 
he would argue that such disregard for legality was particularly pronounced 
when it came to the accelerating European colonization of the region, and he 
strongly sympathized with local officials over the administrative problems this 
caused. Pahlen was thus his own man, and the conclusions of his inspection 
did not, in fact, coincide with the script drawn up in St Petersburg, which is one 
reason why they were largely ignored.31 The last years of Tsarist rule in Turke-
stan would instead be marked by a mixture of military obstruction to Pahlen’s 
proposed extension of civilian rule to the Muslim population, and ever more 
concerted efforts by agencies in St Petersburg to exploit the territory for the 
benefit of “the Russian people.” From August 1914 the priority became to en-
sure the region contributed as much as possible to the war effort, leading to the 
disastrous decision in 1916 to extend labor conscription to the local population. 
However, if Pahlen’s prescribed remedies were ignored, that does not mean 
that he had not correctly diagnosed at least some of the causes and symptoms 
of Turkestan’s administrative malaise.
This article is an attempt to assess the value to the historian of one element 
of the Pahlen Commission’s work, namely the forthright condemnation in both 
the report and Pahlen’s memoirs of the politics and practice of pereselenie, or 
peasant resettlement, in Turkestan. This choice is governed partly by the avail-
 28 D. C. B. Lieven, “Bureaucratic Liberalism in Late Imperial Russia: The Personality, Career 
and Opinions of A. N. Kulomzin,” The Slavonic and East European Review 60:3 (July 1982), 
pp. 413–432.
 29 Andrzej Walicki, Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 
pp. 1–6.
 30 Richard Wortman, The Development of a Russian Legal Consciousness (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1976), pp. 276–283.
 31 On the negative reaction to Pahlen’s proposals at the 1911 conference to draw up a new 
Turkestan statute see Brower, Turkestan, pp. 101–109.
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ability of sources: the most appalling abuses Pahlen’s commission uncovered 
were in Transcaspia, but a thorough assessment of the report’s conclusions on 
the subject would require the use of materials from the archive in Ashkhabad, 
which has never been opened to researchers.32 The Uzbekistan State Archives 
are now also effectively closed to western researchers, however the most im-
portant fields for resettlement were in what is now Kazakhstan, and the ar-
chives in Almaty are fully accessible. The other reason for choosing this topic 
is more positive: Pahlen’s trenchant verdict on pereselenie, namely that it “Sows 
the seed of national strife in an alien region” (zakladyvaet semena natsional’noi 
rozni v inorodcheskom krae) seems eerily prescient of the violence which would 
break out between settlers and nomads in 1916.33 Pahlen also devoted much of 
his later memoir to excoriating the officials of the Pereselencheskoe Upravlenie 
(Resettlement Administration), although here his conclusions were informed 
both by memories of how his recommendations had been ignored, and hind-
sight over the 1916 revolt.34 The volume on peasant colonization in Turkestan 
produced by Pahlen’s Commission of Inspection generated more controver-
sy than any other. In siding with local Turkestan officials against what Peter 
Holquist has rightly called the “technocratic ideology” of the Pereselencheskoe 
Upravlenie in Turkestan and calling for a more measured approach to the colo-
nization of Central Asia, Pahlen was ignoring his original instructions and de-
fying what was perhaps the most powerful Ministry in St Petersburg at that 
time, the Glavnoe Upravlenie Zemledelie i Zemleustroistvo (GUZiZ), of which the 
 32 See Pahlen, Mission to Turkestan, pp. 123–161; newspaper articles describing the situation 
in Transcaspia collected in Turkestanskii sbornik suggest that Pahlen was not exaggerating, 
and allow names to be put to the initials he gave in his memoirs. See in particular: Mest-
nyi, “O shchukakh Zakaspiiskoi oblasti,” Grazhdanin 192 (1908); “Svezho predanie, da veri-
tsia s trudom,” Novoe vremia 11759 (1908) in TS 494, pp. 113–118, 166–1667 which confirm 
Pahlen’s account of the web of corruption surrounding the head of the Military Governor’s 
Chancellery, Colonel Strzhalkovskii, and the inadequacy of the temporary statute under 
which Transcaspia was governed, which had been designed to give the greatest possible 
latitude to the first Governor of the Province, A. N. Kuropatkin; See further K., “Novyi vid 
rabstva,” Rus’ 70 (1907) in TS 417, p. 179; “Vlast’ nachal’stva,” Sovremennoe slovo 333 (1908) 
in TS 494, pp. 128–129, both of which deal with the activities of Kutateladze, the Pristav of 
Merv, guilty of murder and extortion (See also Palen, Kraevoe Upravlenie, pp. 123–124). Ku-
ropatkin, on whose personal form of rule Pahlen blamed many of the shortcomings which 
emerged in the administration of Transcaspia once he had left it, did not attempt to deny 
the guilt of those put on trial, merely asserting that such things could never have happened 
in his day, and that it was a consequence of the general moral decline visible across the 
empire. “General A. N. Kuropatkin o Turkestanskoi revizii,” Turkestanskii kur’er 81 (1908) 
in TS 495, pp. 127–128.
 33 Senator Gofmeister Graf K. K. Palen, Otchet po revizii Turkestanskago kraia, proizvedennoi po 
VYSOCHAISHEMU poveleniiu..., Vol. 6, Pereselencheskoe delo, p. 406.
 34 Pahlen, Mission to Turkestan, p. 193.
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Pereselencheskoe Upravlenie was one of the most important departments.35 His 
inspection coincided with the appointment of the ambitious A. V. Krivoshein 
as its head, and until his assassination in 1911 the GUZiZ also enjoyed the di-
rect patronage of the President of the Council of Ministers, Pyotr Stolypin. 
Willard Sunderland has recently suggested that, had the First World War not 
intervened, the Pereselencheskoe Upravlenie would have evolved into a fully-
fledged colonial ministry, and certainly many of its officials viewed Turkestan 
and other non-Russian regions simply as places to be exploited economically 
and russified through pereselenie, with little or no regard to the interests of the 
local population.36 The measure of Pahlen’s defeat on this issue can be gauged 
from reading Krivoshein’s Zapiska describing his visit to Turkestan in 1912. Far 
from acknowledging the need to slow the pace or alter the nature of peasant 
colonization in Turkestan, he instead envisaged a massive expansion of irriga-
tion that would allow the creation of up to 300,000 Russian households, or a 
population of 1 ½ million settlers: the difficulties of creating new Russian set-
tlements even in the most densely-populated areas should not be a deterrent.37 
Whilst Pahlen’s mandate from St Petersburg as a Revizuiushchii Senator allowed 
him to write with what even now seems astonishing frankness about all as-
pects of Turkestan’s administration in his Commission’s report, the volume on 
Pereselencheskoe Delo shows clear signs of having been toned down, certainly by 
comparison with the trenchant commentary he made on resettlement policies 
in his memoirs, where he accused the Pereselencheskoe Upravlenie’s officials in 
Turkestan not merely of incompetence and arrogance but of rampant corrup-
tion.38 The evident anger and contempt with which Pahlen penned this sec-
tion of his memoirs may reflect his irritation at being worsted in what rapidly 
became a fierce bout of bureaucratic infighting: in this case his advice was not 
merely ignored, but actively rejected. Given that the arbitrary expropriation 
of land for peasant settlers which he so strongly criticized is widely consid-
ered to be an important factor in the outbreak of revolt against Russian rule in 
1916, this makes the conclusions in his report seem all the more poignant and 
prophetic.39
 35 Peter Holquist, “‘In Accord with State Interests and the People’s Wishes’: The Technocratic 
Ideology of Imperial Russia’s Resettlement Administration,” Slavic Review 69:1 (Spring 
2010), pp. 151–179.
 36 Willard Sunderland, “The Ministry of Asiatic Russia: The Colonial Office That Never Was 
But Might Have Been,” Slavic Review 69:1 (Spring 2010), pp. 120–150.
 37 A. P. Krivoshein, Zapiska glavnoupravliaushago zemleustroistvom i zemledeliem o poezdke v 
Turkestanskii krai v 1912 godu (St. Pb.: Gos. Tip., 1912), pp. 59, 67.
 38 Pahlen, Mission to Turkestan, pp. 182–184, 202–203.
 39 The best recent accounts of the 1916 revolt and the reprisals which followed it are Jörn 
Happel, Nomadische Lebenswelten Und Zarische Politik: Der Aufstand in Zentralasien 1916 
(Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2010); Marko Buttino, Revoliutsiia naoborot (Moscow: 
“Zven’ia,” 2007), pp. 58–91 (original Italian ed. 2003); Uyama Tomohiko, “Two Attempts at 
Building a Qazaq State: The Revolt of 1916 and the Alash Movement,” in Stèphane Dudoi-
gnon & Hisao Komatsu, eds., Islam in Politics in Russia and Central Asia (London: Routledge, 
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Pereselenie In TurkesTan
The resettlement of peasants from European Russia in the Asian border-
lands of the Empire had become official policy in the late 1880s, as successively 
more liberal statutes, and eventually the creation of the “Resettlement Admin-
istration” (Pereselencheskoe Upravlenie) in 1896 saw a rapid increase both in the 
numbers of settlers heading “East of the Urals,” and in the state’s attempts to 
regulate and managed the flow.40 Turkestan had seen relatively few settlers 
compared with Siberia or the Northern Steppe: between 1896 and 1909 only 
25,000 officially-registered pereselentsy had entered Turkestan and Semirechie, 
compared to 640,000 in the steppe Governor-Generalship.41 Apart from ques-
2001), pp. 77–98; Daniel Brower, “Kyrgyz Nomads and Russian Pioneers: Colonization and 
Ethnic Conflict in the Turkestan Revolt of 1916,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Ost Europas Neue 
Folge, Band 44, Heft 1 (1996), pp. 41–53; The standard, highly circumspect Soviet work is 
Kh. Tursunov, Vosstanie 1916 g v Srednei Azii i Kazakhstane (Tashkent: FAN, 1962). The only 
general account in English, based entirely on the published sources available at the time, 
remains Edward D. Sokol, The Revolt of 1916 in Russian Central Asia (Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1954). 
 40 There is much excellent recent work on peasant migration and the activities of the Pere-
selencheskoe Upravlenie. Apart from the articles in the Slavic Review’s special forum on the 
agency – Vol. 69 No. 1 (Spring 2010) – cited above, see in particular David Moon, “Peasant Mi-
gration and the Settlement of Russia’s Frontiers 1550–1897,” The Historical Journal 40:4 (1997), 
pp. 859–893; Willard Sunderland, “Peasant Pioneering: Russian Peasant Settlers Describe Col-
onization and the Eastern Frontier, 1880s-1910s,” Journal of Social History 34:4 (Summer 2001), 
pp. 895–922; Nicholas Breyfogle, Heretics and Colonizers: Forging Russia’s Empire in the South 
Caucasus (Ithaca, NY, 2005); Charles Steinwedel, “Resettling People, Unsettling the Eempire: 
Migration and the Challenge of Governance 1861–1917,” in Nicholas Breyfogle, Abby Schrad-
er & Willard Sunderland, eds., Peopling the Russian Periphery: Borderland Colonization in Eur-
asian History (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 128-147. There is no single comprehensive history 
of pereselenie in Turkestan, but a good picture can be built up by combining recent historiogra-
phy and some older works. See Bartol’d, “Istoriia kul’turnoi zhizni”; D. S. M. Williams, “Rus-
sian Peasant Settlement in Semirech’ye,” Central Asian Review 14:2 (1966), pp. 110–122; George 
J. Demko, The Russian Colonization of Kazakhstan, 1896–1916 (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1969); K. Nishiyama, “Russian Colonization in Central Asia: A Case Study of Semi-
rechye, 1867–1922,” in Komatsu Hisao, Obiya Chika & John Schoeberlein, eds., Migration in 
Central Asia: Its History and Current Problems (Osaka: Japan Centre for Area Studies, 2000), pp. 
65–85; Virginia Martin, Law and Custom in the Steppe: The Kazakhs of the Middle Horde and Rus-
sian Colonialism in the Nineteenth Century (Richmond: Curzon Press, 2001), Chapter 3; Gulnar 
Kendirbai, Land and People: The Russian Colonization of the Kazak Steppe (Berlin: ANOR, 2002); 
Stephen Sabol, Russian Colonization and the Genesis of Kazakh National Consciousness (Basing-
stoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 38–52; S. N. Maltusynov, Agrarnyi vopros v Kazakhstane 
i Gosudarstvennaia Duma Rossii 1906–1917gg. (sotsiokul’turnyi podkhod) (Almaty: “Daik–Press,” 
2006); Niccolò Pianciola, Stalinismo di frontiera. Colonizzazione agricola, sterminio dei nomadi e 
costruzione statale in Asia centrale (1905–1936) (Rome: Viella, 2009), pp. 62–86.
 41 N. Turchaninov, ed., Itogi pereselencheskago dvizheniia za vremia c 1896 po 1909 gg. 
(vkliuchitel’no) (St. Pb.: Izd. Perselencheskago Upravleniia, 1910), pp. 48–53.
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tions of climate and remoteness, this was partly because of strong opposition 
from local administrators, who, whilst they themselves had (largely for pur-
poses of military security) created lines of Russian and Ukrainian settlements 
along the main post-roads through the steppe, strongly resented the political 
problems caused by the creation of Russian villages in already crowded areas 
such as the Ferghana Valley, and the replacement of hard-working, revenue-
paying native peasants with lazy, feckless and drunken Russians and Ukraini-
ans.42 Instances of this hostility towards Russian colonization are not hard to 
find. In 1898, for example, when asked if there was room in his district for a 
new Russian settlement, the Djizak Uezdnyi Nachal’nik replied curtly that there 
was far too little water and that colonization could not be contemplated.43 In 
the same year the then Governor-General, Baron Vrevskii, in his general report 
to the Interior Ministry, also insisted that there was simply not enough land 
for Russian settlement and noted the immense difficulties the administration 
of Ferghana Province had in settling 133 families from Kiev Province.44 In 1907, 
General V. I. Pokotilo, the military Governor of the Ferghana Oblast’, wrote to 
Governor-General Grodekov insisting that
Russian colonization is entirely impossible, neither in the valley, the settled 
region with irrigation, because the quantity of that type of land is insufficient 
even for the demands made upon it by the natives, nor in the mountainous 
nomadic region, because this land, because of climatic conditions, is not fit for 
arable farming, but for pastoralism, and is already becoming crowded for this 
purpose.45
 It was this kind of local opposition which the doyen of Russian agrono-
mists and colonization experts, Alexander Arkad’evich Kaufman was refer-
ring to when he wrote of “local actors” (mestnye deiateli) who were pessimistic 
about the future prospects for pereselenie.46 Turkestan was officially “closed” 
to settlement from 1895–1905, and again in 1907–1910, and the official guides 
 42 L. Sinitsyn, “Zametki po povodu nashikh pereselentsev,” TV 11 (15 March 1888) is a typical 
early example of the contempt with which they were often viewed by educated Russians in 
Turkestan. See further Jeff Sahadeo, Russian Colonial Society in Tashkent, 1865–1923 (Bloom-
ington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2007), pp. 108–136.
 43 “O razmerakh zemel’nykh uchastkov godnykh dlia obrazovaniia Russkikh poselkov” 
(01/08/1898) Tsentral’nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Respubliki Uzbekistan (TsGARUz), f. 
I–21, op. 1, d. 439, l. 1. 
 44 “Vsepoddaneishii doklad Turkestanskogo General-Gubernatora Barona Vrevskago za 
1898 g” RGIA, f. 472, op. 66, d. 475, l. 16.
 45 TsGARUz, f. I–1, op. 17, d. 811 “Doklad voennogo gubernatora Ferganskoi oblasti po pere-
selencheskomu voprosu v Ferganskoi oblasti, v osobennosti v Kurartskoi doline,” ll. 54–67, 
published in T. Kotiukova, “Problemy rossiiskoi pereselencheskoi politiki v Turkestane v 
nachale XX veka,” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal 2 (Feb. 2010), p. 60.
 46 A. A. Kaufman, Pereseleniia i kolonizatsiia (St. Pb.: Bibl. “Obshchestvennoi Pol’zy,” 1905), 
pp. iv–v.
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published for migrants carried warnings to this effect,47 but this did not pre-
vent considerable numbers of samovol’tsy or “self-willed” migrants from mak-
ing their way to Semirechie in particular, where they vastly outnumbered those 
who had entered the region under official auspices. By 1908 Turkestan had just 
over 100,000 peasant colonists (65,000 of whom were in Semirechie) living in 
114 officially-sanctioned settlements, but at least as many again were squatting 
or renting land illegally from the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz.48 The first regional of-
fice of the Pereselencheskoe Upravlenie in Turkestan was set up in Semirechie in 
1903, shortly before the province was re-opened for settlement, and its initial 
and most urgent task was the settlement of these squatters on state land. How-
ever, when in 1906 its head, B. A. Veletskii (the bête noire of Pahlen’s memoirs) 
proposed a conference in Vernyi under his leadership to discuss the question 
of expropriating Kazakh land for this purpose, he was dismissed in no uncer-
tain terms by the Governor-General and Governor of Semirechie. They wrote 
that this could only be undertaken by local officials with a close knowledge of 
conditions in Turkestan (which, they openly implied, Veletskii and his men 
lacked), and that representatives of the local population should be given a de-
cisive say.49 Pahlen’s Commission of inspection thus arrived just as the debate 
over the future of Russian colonization was becoming particularly acute, partly 
because the opening of the Orenburg-Tashkent railway in 1906 created new 
possibilities for mass resettlement. As Pahlen later noted in his memoirs, the 
conflict between central and local organs of power over pereselenie was both 
open and vicious: at least one Governor-General had been forced to resign in 
part because of his attempts to resist the Pereselencheskoe Upravlenie, and its 
officials were an increasingly visible and unwelcome presence in Turkestan’s 
cities.50 
 47 Pereselenie za Ural v 1908 godu. Spravochnaia knizhka s kartoiu zaseliaemykh pereselentsami 
mestnostei i zheleznykh dorog Aziiatskoi Rossii (St. Pb., Tip. “Sel’skii Vestnik,” 1908). The slip 
pasted on the front cover reads: “v Turkestan i na Kavkaz pereselenie ne razreshaetsia.” 
The edition for 1910 has the same message printed on the front cover.
 48 Palen, Pereselencheskoe delo, pp. 249–261.
 49 Veletskii to the Turk. G-G (12/09/1906); G. M. Mustafin to Gen. Ionov, Gov. of Semirechie 
(24/09/1906); Ionov to the Turk. G-G (04/11/1906) (copies) Tsentral’nyi Gosudarstvennyi 
Arkhiv Respubliki Kazakhstan (TsGARKaz), f. 19 [Zaveduiushchii pereselencheskim de-
lom v Semirechenskoi oblasti], op. 1, d. 38 “O Vyiasnenii ‘izlishnikh’ zemel’ i o zemel’nyk 
normakh v Semirechenskoi oblasti,” ll. 1–2ob. 
 50 Pahlen, Mission to Turkestan, p. 183; as noted earlier, it seems probable here that Pahlen 
was referring to N. I. Grodekov, who already in 1897, when he was acting Governor-Gen-
eral, had closed the region to Resettlement on the grounds that it was causing too many 
problems with the natives (Palen, Pereselencheskoe delo, pp. 179–180); As Governor-General 
in 1907–08 he again did his best to contain the ambitions of the Pereselencheskoe upravlenie, 
sending reports to St. Petersburg warning that its activities were in danger of generating 
rebellion on the scale of a “Second Caucasus.” If St. Petersburg expected his successor, 
General P. I. Mishchenko (1853–1918) to be more compliant they were disappointed, as he 
gave similar warnings and within a few months of his arrival in 1908 ordered the local ad-
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The Commission’s conclusions on Pereselenie closely reflected the views 
of most local military officials. In the dispute between (as he saw it) paternal-
ist old Turkestantsy and upstart, quasi-revolutionary technocrats, there was no 
doubt whose side Pahlen was on.51 In Pereselencheskoe Delo he quoted at length 
and with approval a report from Pokotilo, by then the Governor of Semirechie 
(and whom Pahlen described in his memoirs as “a thorough, earnest, and en-
ergetic administrator”), and who used the language of “legality” (zakonnost’) in 
much the same way as Pahlen himself:52 
Having admitted illegality (bezzakonie) in their affairs, the Resettlement of-
ficials do not see any limits to them. All their work is carried out “by eye”: 
In Semirechie there is much land which is apparently free, the settlements 
are few, it is necessary to arrange things for the settlers, and the Kirgiz still 
have plenty of land. These are the superficial facts on which they now base 
the delineation of resettlement plots in the province. They select the best ir-
rigated Kirgiz land and, in breach of the law, farmsteads and ploughland. [...] 
In general the result of all these illegal (nezakonnyi) and superficial enterprises 
could be the following: a) the Kirgiz, who are already in a panic, and seeing 
that they are really being deported from their native nest, will begin to riot; b) 
tens of thousands of new settlers, who cannot be catered for even in this slap-
dash manner will appear in the province as a threatening mob of hungry and 
destitute people and c) the Cossacks, feeling a bitter unearned injury, when 
land might be taken away from their stanitsas, will pass it into the hands of the 
settlers by an illegal route.53
Pahlen also quoted a letter from the Vernyi Uezdnyi Nachal’nik (anoth-
er official whom he mentioned in complimentary terms in his memoirs)54 of 
4th January 1908 in which the latter complained that the officials of the Pere-
selencheskoe Upravlenie invariably selected land for settlement which was al-
ready under cultivation by Kazakhs or Kirgiz and then disappeared, leaving 
him and his fellow District officials to deal with the consequences:
The striving of the Resettlement officials to arrange things for the settlers as 
quickly as possible is understandable, but the Pereselencheskoe Upravlenie – is a 
ministration to halt the expropriation of nomadic lands for pereselenie (Brower, Turkestan, 
pp. 140–142). At the time, however, Mishchenko’s departure in March 1909 was widely 
attributed to Pahlen himself – see “Reabilitatsiia Gen. Mishchenko,” Sovremennoe slovo 508 
(1909) in TS 509, p. 27. A telegram from Mishchenko published in Novoe vremia 11765 (1908) 
in TS 494, p. 178 which uses the “a few bad apples” defense for Turkestan’s administration 
suggests that he and the Senator did not see eye to eye. 
 51 Both Adeeb Khalid and Peter Holquist have referred to this as a “Viceregal mindset.” 
Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform, pp. 50–61; Holquist, “In Accord with State 
Interests,” pp. 161–162. This is perhaps a fair description of Pahlen’s overall belief in the 
paternalistic benevolence of colonialism, but with its overtones of high-handed arbitrari-
ness does not perhaps do justice to his firm belief in the constraints of legality.
 52 Pahlen, Mission to Turkestan, p. 198.
 53 Palen, Pereselencheskoe delo, pp. 131–132.
 54 Pahlen, Mission to Turkestan, pp. 205–206.
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temporary administration. Today it is here, and tomorrow it is gone, and the 
full weight of the consequences of its inadequate decisions for the interests of 
the population of a particular place falls on the shoulders of the permanent 
officials, who have remained to govern, i.e. the administration.55
Pahlen ensured that such sentiments received a prominent airing in Pere-
selencheskoe Delo, which claimed that the Resettlement Administration’s officials 
were quite incapable of giving any real direction or planning to what remained 
a largely spontaneous and disorganized process.56 Instead he advocated hand-
ing over control to the local officials, “men on the spot” who understood the 
country and its people:
One of the most serious reasons for this phenomenon, unfavorable to the 
interests of Russian power, is, in my opinion, the complete impossibility of 
conducting difficult colonization matters directly from Petersburg. Not only 
would I say that, owing to the distance of Turkestan from our Governmen-
tal centre and the extreme particularities of local conditions mean that such 
direction can only have a paper, purely theoretical character, I submit that a 
just and wise reconciliation of general Government aims with local demands 
can be realized only through the complete independence of the highest local 
administrative organs within the limits of those general instructions which it 
has been given.57
Nevertheless, despite Pahlen’s personal hostility to the Resettlement Ad-
ministration and its officials, it is clear that much of his Commission’s report 
on Pereselencheskoe Delo drew upon its publications and statistics, in particu-
lar O. Shkapskii’s work on Semirechie.58 Accordingly some of its observations 
and criticisms regarding the backward and unenterprising nature of the ag-
riculture pursued by settlers, their dependence on land rented illegally from 
the nomadic population, lack of morals, and poor economic productivity,59 
echoed those made by the more realistic agronomists and technicians of the 
Pereselencheskoe Upravlenie, who often harbored a certain pessimism over the 
weaknesses of the Russian or Cossack settler as a kulturträger.60 No less a parti-
san of pereselenie than A. A. Kaufman had written in 1905 that “of course, only 
with a large helping of blind optimism is it possible to dream of the cultural 
impact of the Russian settler on the enterprise of the Turkestan native.”61 The 
Pahlen Commission’s report similarly noted that in areas where producing 
crops was difficult, the settlers rapidly gave up the struggle altogether, and 
 55 Palen, Pereselencheskoe delo, pp. 44–48.
 56 Ibid., pp. 195–200.
 57 Ibid., p. 406.
 58 O. Shkapskii, “Pereselentsy i agrarnyi vopros v Semirechenskoi oblasti,” Voprosy kolonizatsii. 
Sbornik statei [VK] 1 (St. Pb.: Izd. A. V. Uspenskogo, 1907), pp. 19–52.
 59 Palen, Pereselencheskoe delo, pp. 162–163, 302–303.
 60 A. V. Remnev & N. G. Suvorova, “Obrusenie Aziatskikh okrain Rossiiskoi Imperii: opti-
mizm i pessimizm russkoi kolonizatsii,” Istoricheskie zapiski 11:129 (2008), pp. 132–179.
 61 Kaufman, Pereseleniia i kolonizatsiia, pp. 335–338.
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that they were often insufficiently “agrarian,” detached from the land, and in 
many cases pursuing artisanal work rather than agriculture.62 Even sturdier 
settlers from black-earth regions were incapable of increasing the productiv-
ity of the land, and in most cases actually damaged it.63 Unlike the natives of 
Turkestan, they were slow to turn to cash crops, and made a negligible contri-
bution to the booming cotton economy of the region. Even in settlements close 
to major towns or to the railway, where it would be easy to grow cash crops or 
vegetables for the urban markets, the colonists stuck to wheat. Only in one of 
the settlements of Ferghana province was cotton grown in significant quanti-
ties, and this was largely in imitation of the native smallholdings which sur-
rounded it.64 These were not particularly controversial allegations, and indeed 
were partly accepted by the colonization authorities. In 1912, admittedly, Kri-
voshein, who cherished a wholly unrealistic vision of a Turkestan populated 
by cotton-growing Slavs, would assert that cotton cultivation was spreading 
rapidly amongst the settlers, noting that in some settlements on irrigated land 
in the Samarkand and Tashkent districts up to 30% of the sown area was un-
der cotton65 However, he was misrepresenting the conclusions of an inquiry 
carried out by the Syr-Darya Provincial Statistical Committee on the question, 
which, as it was later published in Voprosy kolonizatsii, presumably had some 
sanction from his department. This showed that settlers were indeed increas-
ingly diversifying from grain to other crops, notably sugar beet, maash (mung 
beans) and sunflowers, but concluded that the significance of Russian settle-
ment for the planting of cotton was negligible, not least because, apart from 
those few districts mentioned by Krivoshein, most settlers farmed unirrigated 
land in areas climatically unsuited to it.66 Whilst by the outbreak of the First 
World War more colonists had learnt to grow cotton and other cash crops, the 
Pereselencheskoe Upravlenie’s own experts admitted that they still struggled to 
adapt to irrigated agriculture and preferred to concentrate on grain and forage 
crops with which they were already familiar.67
The Pahlen Commission also criticized the widespread renting of land 
from the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz by the settlers, which allowed the latter to grow 
wheat and raise cattle on a far larger scale than would have been possible had 
they remained confined to their official plots. This practice was illegal because, 
in principle, under both the Turkestan and Steppe statutes the nomads had no 
rights of ownership over land they did not use themselves, but this did not pre-
 62 Pahlen, Pereselencheskoe delo, pp. 228–229.
 63 Ibid., pp. 415–416.
 64 Ibid., pp. 290–296.
 65 Krivoshein, Zapiska, pp. 62–63.
 66 P. Skryplev, “Khlopkovodstvo i Russkie pereselentsy,” VK 12 (1913), pp. 215, 223–224.
 67 V. Voshchinin, Ocherki novago Turkestana. Svet i teni Russkoi kolonizatsii (St. Pb.: Tip. Tov. 
“Nash Vek,” 1914), pp. 21–23; A. Woeikoff, Le Turkestan Russe (Paris: Armand Michel, 
1914), p. 305.
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vent ad hoc arrangements being negotiated between Russian settlements and 
neighboring auls, which the authorities were powerless to prevent and upon 
which the whole enterprise of pereselenie in Turkestan came to depend: “The 
peasants themselves in the Aulie-Ata District uniformly affirm that without 
the renting of Kirgiz land it would be impossible for them to live, impossible 
for them to feed their cattle and they would be forced to seek happiness in new 
places.”68 In 1905 the practice was to some extent retrospectively legalized by a 
revision to the law which allowed nomads to rent land to settlers temporarily 
in cases where each household had only 3 desiatinas of land or fewer, but the 
terms even of this statute were universally violated.69 In some cases the rented 
land was the settlers’ sole means of support, as they had never received any 
official allocation from the authorities. Once again, many of these conclusions 
were derived from the Pereselencheskoe Upravlenie’s own publications or those 
of other partisans of Russian settlement. As early as 1892 I. I. Geier, founding 
editor of the strongly pro-settlement newspaper Russkii Turkestan, noted that 
the peasants of Krasnovodskoe in the Chimkent district, on being refused fur-
ther land by the local authorities for the expansion of their settlement, simply 
purchased it from the neighboring Kazakhs.70 Shkapskii had written that in 
Pishpek district in 1906, out of 1,205 families who had arrived in the region 
as samovol’tsy in 1900, 204 had been resettled on land forcibly taken from the 
Kazakhs and Kyrgyz along the river Chu, but 330 had no land other than what 
they rented from the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz for between 4.7 and 5.5 rubles per 
desiatina.71 
aTTackIng The Pereselencheskoe UPravlenie
Such criticisms of settler agriculture echoed those made by most other 
official and unofficial sources, and were not in themselves in conflict with the 
wider aims of peasant resettlement. As Peter Holquist has noted, the Pahlen 
report’s contemptuous attack on the system of “norms” for the allocation of 
land to settlers, which the senator also later ridiculed in his memoirs, was far 
more controversial:72
 68 Palen, Pereselencheskoe delo, pp. 306–310, 313; examples of such written agreements by Ka-
zakhs to rent or sell land to settlers can be seen in TsGARKaz, f. 184 [Zaveduiushchii pere-
selencheskim delom v Aulieatinskom uezde Syr-Dar’inskoi oblasti], op., d. 14 “o sporakh 
mezhdu zhiteliam selo Stavropolka i kazakhami sosednykh aulov za vygodnykh zemel’,” 
ll. 12ob, 46, 49ob (all from 1911).
 69 Palen, Pereselencheskoe delo, pp. 302–303.
 70 I. I. Geier, Po russkim seleniiam Syr-Dar’inskoi oblasti (pis’ma s dorogi), Vol. 1 Chimkentskii uezd 
(Tashkent: Tip-Lit. brat’ia Kamenskikh, 1893), pp. 52–54.
 71 Shkapskii,” Pereselentsy i agrarnyi vopros,” pp. 22–24.
 72 Holquist, “In Accord with State Interests,” pp. 161–162; here Pahlen demonstrates a firm 
belief in the virtues of experience and common-sense over airy theorizing which is also 
highly reminiscent of Nolde: Holquist, “Dilemmas of a Progressive Administrator,” pp. 
265–266.
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These magic formulae were to be derived from statistical research which 
would show the exact number of acres needed by a “toiler” in any given dis-
trict [...] in order to be able to follow the latest scientific methods of husbandry 
with the means at his disposal. So far as I remember the figures produced by 
a learned statistician with a long record of work for the Government of Oren-
burg were thirty hectares or thereabouts per nomad, old and young inclusive, 
and six hectares per farmer. The following reasoning was then applied. Here 
is a district belonging to the Tsar: it contains X number of hectares and is in-
habited by Y number of nomads. As each nomad is entitled to thirty hectares, 
the total amount of land due to them is Y multiplied by thirty. Deduct that fig-
ure from the total acreage of the area and you have a balance N which should 
be handed over to the settlers. Q. E. D.73
He went on to describe what this could mean in practice in regions where 
(as was increasingly the case) formerly nomadic Kazakhs or Kyrgyz had ir-
rigated and cultivated the areas they used as zimovki (qishlaq – winter quar-
ters), only to be deprived of the land they had “brought to life,” which was 
then given to colonists by the officials of the Resettlement Administration. 
The latter would claim that according to the “norm,” there was still plenty of 
land left for the nomadic population, even if none of it was suitable for culti-
vation, and no adequate compensation had been paid. These criticisms also 
appeared in the Commission’s report, in rather more measured language but 
with considerably more corroborative detail. It noted that in Semirechie, the 
province which received the bulk of Turkestan’s settlers, the Pereselencheskoe 
Upravlenie had failed to carry out a detailed agricultural and hydrographical 
survey to determine either the extent and type of arable land, or the amount 
of it which was already being used by sedentarised Kazakhs and Kyrgyz. In-
stead its officials simply took the techniques for establishing “norms” that had 
been developed by the Shcherbina Commission for the Steppe Region without 
making any attempt to adapt them to local conditions.74 Both the landscape 
and the agricultural practices in Semirechie were very different from those in 
the Steppe provinces, where most cultivation was of winter wheat on unirri-
gated land. Southern Semirechie had a varied terrain of valleys and mountains, 
where there was a high proportion of irrigated agriculture and of high-value 
cash crops such as peaches and cotton. The consequence was that the land des-
ignated as surplus to the “norm” required by the local population and chosen 
for Russian settlement was usually already occupied, irrigated and cultivated 
by former nomads, who were deprived of the fruits of their labor and in many 
cases their homes with wholly inadequate compensation. In Semirechie alone, 
despite the fact that in theory the local population retained more than twice 
 73 Pahlen, Mission to Turkestan, p. 191.
 74 On the Shcherbina Commission, which carried out a detailed agrarian survey of the north-
ern steppe, see Ian Campbell, “Empire Promoted, Empire Contested: The Shcherbina Ex-
pedition of 1896–1903,” Central Asian Survey (forthcoming).
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the amount of land allocated to them as the “norm,” the creation of 59 Russian 
peasant settlements had led to the displacement of 5,169 Kyrgyz and Kazakh 
households, with compensation of no more than thirty rubles each at best, and 
in some cases as little as five or six. Nor was this problem confined to Semire-
chie – all the settlements in the Chimkent, Aulie-Ata and Perovsk regions of 
Syr-Darya Province were also built on land that had formerly been in Kazakh 
occupation.75
Pahlen went still further in claiming that such practices were not only 
arbitrary, politically dangerous and economically destructive, but also tech-
nically illegal, a breach of the 1886 Turkestan Statute, which guaranteed the 
right of use of land in permanent hereditary occupation “on which labor had 
been expended,” as Pahlen put it. Pahlen might have been correct, but the le-
gal situation was complex. The 1886 Turkestan statute declared that all land 
in the region was state property, but recognized effective occupation and use 
(pol’zovanie) of the land by the sedentary population, with rights of sale and 
inheritance guaranteed by pre-existing Islamic law and custom, to which, Be-
atrice Penati has argued, it effectively makes a formal renvoi.76 As Ekaterina 
Pravilova has noted, Russian notions of what constituted “Islamic law” in the 
region were heavily influenced by French and Ottoman models,77 but in prac-
tice, at least until the early 1900s the only form of law which mattered in sed-
entary regions of Central Asia was that administered by the local qazis, which 
remained largely untouched by colonial norms, and which in all but the most 
formal sense preserved the full rights of ownership which the population had 
enjoyed before the conquest.78 In principle nomads were granted a similar right 
of “pol’zovanie” for their pastures, but in practice the implications were rather 
different, partly because unless they were already at least semi-sedentarised 
they could not point to specific plots that were in individual or family posses-
sion, but also because they were supposed to have recourse only to customary 
law (‘adat) rather than Muslim law (shari’a), and the former gave much weaker 
protection than the latter.79 The fragility of their claim to the land was more 
 75 Palen, Pereselencheskoe delo, pp. 35–43, 51–61, 280.
 76 “Polozhenie ob upravlenii Turkestanskogo kraia,” PSZ Sob. 3 Tom VI, No. 3814 (12 June 1886), 
pp. 328, 338–339; Beatrice Penati, “Swamps, Sorghum and Saxauls: Marginal Lands and the 
Fate of Russian Turkestan (c. 1880–1915),” Central Asian Survey 29:1 (March 2010), p. 61.
 77 Ekaterina Pravilova, “The Property of Empire: Islamic Law and Russian Agrarian Policy in 
Transcaucasia and Turkestan,” Kritika 12:2 (Spring 2011), pp. 353–386.
 78 Paolo Sartori, “Introduction: Dealing with States of Property in Modern and Colonial Cen-
tral Asia,” Central Asian Survey 29:1 (March 2010), pp. 3–4.
 79 This colonial taxonomy was almost entirely artificial – in practice nomads had long made 
extensive use of Islamic law, whilst what the Russians referred to as Shari’a amongst the 
sedentary population carried a substantial admixture of custom. See Martin, Law and Cus-
tom, pp. 1–14; Sergey N. Abashin, “Qalim und Mahr in Mittelasien. Die Moderne Praxis 
und die Debatten über Scharia und Adat,” in Michael Kemper & Maurus Reinkowski, 
eds., Rechtspluralismus in der Islamischen Welt. Gewohnheitsrecht zwischen Staat und Gesell-
schaft (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2005), pp. 195–207. 
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fully revealed in the revised Steppe Statute of 1891, under which Semirechie 
was regulated even after it returned to the Turkestan Governor-Generalship in 
1897: article 120 stated that “the land, occupied by nomads, remains in indefi-
nite collective use of the nomads, on the basis of custom and the rules of this 
statute,” but a note added that “land, which appears to be surplus to require-
ments (izlishki) for the nomads, will come under the direction of the Ministry 
of State Properties.”80 Pahlen argued that land which was being cultivated, re-
gardless of whether or not the wider “norm” had been exceeded, could never 
be considered “surplus.” In all this, once again, he was echoing the complaints 
and criticisms of local officials, who for the previous two years had been ar-
guing that the system for designating “surplus” land employed by the Pere-
selencheskoe Upravlenie was arbitrary, and that the Shcherbina Commission’s 
norms were unsuited to the different agrarian conditions in Turkestan: as one 
Semirechie official wrote in 1907, “The application of these norms to the Kirgiz 
of the Pishpek district must be recognized as completely impossible and un-
just,” and these views were shared by Governor-General Grodekov himself.81 
Indeed it was probably a new set of regulations which would have both barred 
the expropriation of irrigated and cultivated land and restricted eligibility for 
resettlement only to those samovol’tsy who were already squatting in Turkes-
tan, which finally led to Grodekov’s dismissal (or forced resignation) only a 
few days after he tried to introduce them.82 Pahlen had local opinion on his 
side when he concluded that the Pereselencheskoe Upravlenie’s system of expro-
priating “surplus” land under the system of “norms” was in breach of both 
the Turkestan and Steppe Statutes, but this was not a view which found many 
takers in St Petersburg.83
Pahlen thus concluded that most of the settlement which had taken place 
had been poorly-planned, carried out without sufficient care to protect the 
rights of the local population, and in many cases was in active breach of the 
law.84 Russian rule would be better defended by a form of colonization which 
respected the rights of the local population and would reinforce their respect 
for Russian justice and law: what was happening at the moment under the aus-
pices of the Resettlement Administration, by contrast, was damaging Russian 
prestige and the local economy in equal measure:
 80 “Polozhenie ob upravlenii oblastei Akmolinskoi, Semipalatinskoi, Semirechenskoi, 
Ural’skoi i Turgaiskoi i ob izmenenii nekotorykh statei Polozhenii ob upravlenii Turkes-
tanskago kraia,” PSZ Sob. 3, Tom XI, No. 7574 (1891), p. 143.
 81 Letter of 17/12/1907 quoted in “Zhurnal obshchego prisutstviia Semirechenskogo Oblast-
nogo Pravleniia” (02/01/1908) (copy) TsGARKaz, f. 19, op. 1, d. 38, l. 12ob.
 82 “Usloviia dlia norm kirgizskogo zemlepol’zovaniia” (11/03/1908) (copy) TsGARKaz, f. 19, 
op. 1, d. 38, ll. 18ob.
 83 Palen, Pereselencheskoe delo, pp. 35–43, 51–61, 280.
 84 Ibid., pp. 408–409.
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The goal of Russifying the region (tsel’ obruseniia kraia) by means of forcibly 
disseminating Russian nationality is also unattainable, at least through re-
settlement. All those attracted to resettle in the borderlands by the free distri-
bution of land and Government loans turn out to be, as experience shows, the 
weakest elements of the Russian peasantry and petty-bourgeoisie, and also 
the sweepings of Siberian colonization. Entering the region with negligible 
morals, incapable in any way of raising the productivity of the country, bear-
ing only a lightened burden of taxes and duties and sustained by government 
loans – the settlers, unfortunately, have not gained any respect for themselves 
amongst the natives and, through their disordered way of life often put off 
this population from adopting Russian customs and Russian culture. Final-
ly, possessing considerable privileges, when compared with the natives, in 
their relations with the administration, they provoke the native population, 
which considers itself aggrieved through the forcible requisition of land and 
water, and sow the seeds of national discord and enmity, which could soon 
have consequences. In my view there is a different route which we should 
follow for the colonization of Turkestan – slower, but also more just, cheap 
and correct.85
The particularities of Turkestan demanded that settlers be chosen, not 
because they came from land-hungry regions or belonged to the category of 
meshchany-zemlevladel’tsy, but because they were strong, capable and cultured.86 
This was effectively a form of Stolypin’s “wager on the strong,” and elsewhere 
in the report Pahlen expressed his preference for the independent khutor over 
the intractable version of the obshchina which existed amongst Central Asian 
settlers.87 If the assistance provided by the Resettlement Administration were 
removed, then Turkestan might attract fewer settlers, but those would consist 
of only “the strongest representatives of the Russian nation (narodnost’),” with 
sufficient hardihood, skill and capital to break in uncultivated tracts of land 
and truly develop the riches of the region in partnership with the local popula-
tion, rather than feckless weaklings who took advantage of Government lar-
gesse to seize already-cultivated land from the “natives,” “destructive work 
which already in the near future will only be possible with the protection of 
military force.”88 In the light of the events of 1916, such sentiments seem omi-
nously prescient.
However, despite the Pahlen Report’s apparently frank and unqualified 
condemnation of almost all aspects of pereselenie in Turkestan, it would be un-
wise to exaggerate the Senator’s opposition to Russian colonization. He did 
not recommend that the program be brought to a halt, simply that it be imple-
mented more slowly and carefully and under local supervision – in his mem-
oirs he waxed lyrical about the earlier colonization efforts overseen by General 
 85 Ibid., p. 418.
 86 Ibid., p. 430.
 87 Ibid., pp. 162–163.
 88 Ibid., p. 419.
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G. A. Kolpakovskii in Semirechie.89 In some respects his vision of a Turkestan 
opened up for more intensive development by Russian and foreign capital and 
entrepreneurship was not so very far from that advanced by Krivoshein (whom 
Pahlen described as “very able”). The difference was firstly that Pahlen did not 
share the GUZiZ chief’s faith in the ability of State agencies to apply “scien-
tific” theories to foster this, advocating instead that it be left to the market, and 
secondly, that for him it clearly mattered little whether Turkestan’s resources 
were developed by Russians or by natives, so long as they were developed.90
There are also clearly some important omissions from Pereselencheskoe 
Delo. It is notable that the cases of outright criminality which Pahlen refers to 
in his memoirs – centered on the figure of Veletskii, the head of the Resettle-
ment Administration in Semirechie, and ranging from the systematic falsifying 
of data to the embezzlement of settler loans – are not mentioned in the official 
report.91 There is also a curious dissonance between the forthright conclusion 
to Pereselencheskoe Delo, in which Pahlen warned that the policies of the Re-
settlement Administration risked generating serious ethnic strife (whilst at the 
same time writing that the native population, despite their grievances, were 
entirely reconciled to Russian rule),92 and the brief, rather bland section in the 
main body of the volume which considered relations between settlers and the 
local population. Although acknowledging that in some cases the expropria-
tion of land by the Resettlement Administration and its occupation by settlers 
had led to tensions, it claimed that 
All the same, in general, it is essential to recognize, that almost everywhere in 
the region relations between peasants and natives are becoming little by little 
more or less peaceful and neighborly, founded on a known solidarity of inter-
ests. Perhaps the most decisive influence on the establishment of such a way 
of life are the gradually increasing business relations between the two sides 
in the matter of the renting of land and the collective irrigation of fields. The 
exception is found only in some settlements of the Andijan and Osh Uezds of 
the Ferghana Oblast’, in particular the settlement of Pokrovskoe.93
The complex economic interdependence which was developing between 
settlers and nomads is striking and requires further study, but this passage 
nevertheless stands in curious contrast to Pahlen’s conclusions elsewhere. The 
report on the incident at Pokrovskoe, written by the same General Pokotilo 
whom Pahlen had quoted approvingly with regard to Semirechie, cast serious 
doubts on this optimistic conclusion. He noted that the commandant of the 
region surrounding Pokrovskoe had written a few months previously to say 
the settlers had been consistently encroaching on Kyrgyz land since the settle-
 89 Pahlen, Mission to Turkestan, pp. 180–181.
 90 Palen, Pereselencheskoe delo, p. 413; Pahlen, Mission to Turkestan, p. 184.
 91 Pahlen, Mission to Turkestan, pp. 182–184, 202–203, 213, 219–222.
 92 Palen, Pereselencheskoe delo, p. 417.
 93 Ibid., pp. 338–344.
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ment was established ten years previously, and that the latter were beginning 
to protest to the administration. In the spring of 1907 the settlers had called 
an extraordinary meeting of their skhod and decided unanimously to forcibly 
plough up and sow their crops on Kyrgyz land with weapons in their hands, 
and the Kyrgyz had made preparations to resist them. The administration had 
managed to prevent an outbreak of violence on this occasion, but “The enmity 
not only remains, but is growing.”94
The suggestion in the Pahlen report that such tensions were limited to 
the crowded lands of Ferghana is all the more striking when one considers the 
numerous petitions related to pereselenie which the Commission received from 
elsewhere in Turkestan, both from Kazakhs and Kyrgyz who had lost land and 
from settlers who claimed they did not have enough of it. The Pahlen Fond in 
RGIA is full of these and they offer some fascinating insights into the social and 
economic life of the time, and on the curious relationship, compounded of both 
hostility and dependence, which existed between settlers and nomads. One of 
the most eloquent reads as follows:
Peasants of the Semirechie Oblast’ Pishpek uezd Belovodskaia volost’ village of 
Novo-Troitskaia
Petition.
We have been living almost forty years in the village of Novo-Troitskaia, for-
merly Sukuluk. We had land for 206 male souls allotted to us, i.e. 2060 de-
siatinas in all. Now we have 550 souls, and the land is entirely insufficient, 
together with which it is exhausted as it is not chernozem [black earth] but 
suchlinok [dried up], and without irrigation is not productive. Although we 
would water it we do not have enough from the river, we receive 1/5 and the 
majority is taken by the Kirgiz, who rent to the Dungans for the irrigation of 
the rice sown below the post-road [...]
Nevertheless it would still be possible to live somehow, if the Kirgiz 
rented out their spare land which is lying uncultivated and which would be 
enough not just for our village, but also for others. 
Before the Kirgiz of the Sukuluk volost’ rented [to us] when they had good 
administrators from the manaps. Dikanbai Djandrachev and others who lived 
with us in a friendly and neighborly way and did not forbid their Kirgiz from 
renting us land.
Now the Kirgiz of that volost’ Cholpankul Tymalin has acquired some 
sort of power over all the Kirgiz and things have become very hard for us as 
Cholpankul Tymalin has forbidden and forbids his Kirgiz from renting us 
land under pasture and the Kirgiz are more afraid of him than of the Gover-
nor-General and consider him to be almost a Khan.95
 94 TsGARUz, f. I–1, op. 17, d. 811 “Doklad voennogo gubernatora Ferganskoi oblasti po pere-
selencheskomu voprosu v Ferganskoi oblasti, v osobennosti v Kurartskoi doline,” ll. 54–67 
in Kotiukova, “Problemy Rossiiskoi pereselencheskoi politiki,” p. 61; the same text is re-
printed in Palen, Pereselencheskoe delo, p. 343.
 95 “Zhaloba krestian Semirechenskoi oblasti Pishpekskogo uezda Belovodskoi volosti sela 
Novo-Troitskogo,” RGIA, f. 1396, op. 1, d. 45 “Zhaloby zhitelei Turkestanskogo kraia na 
pritesneniia i vziatochnichestvo mestnoi administratsii,” l. 238.
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This petition is referred to briefly in Pereselencheskoe Delo, but only as evi-
dence of the shortage of water which often afflicted peasant settlements and 
the disputes which this caused, whilst the clear reference it makes to the wors-
ening relations between settlers and Kyrgyz is ignored:96 in 1916 Belovodskaya 
volost’ would be the site of some of the worst violence of the rebellion, as a mas-
sacre of settlers was followed by vicious reprisals against the nomadic popu-
lation.97 Petitions from the local population – complaining that settlers were 
encroaching their land, or that the Pereselencheskoe Upravlenie was proposing to 
seize land which was either unsuitable for arable farming or already occupied 
by zimovki for colonization purposes – were not referred to specifically at all in 
the Commission’s report, although they must have informed its conclusions, 
and Pahlen clearly drew on his memory of them in his memoirs.98 This may 
simply be a consequence of multiple authorship (it seems probable that Pahlen 
himself only wrote the concluding pages of this volume), but it may also be a 
consequence of enforced editing and censorship, reflecting the hostile recep-
tion which was being prepared for Pahlen’s work on Pereselenie even before the 
report was published.
The TechnocraTs FIghT Back
As the Commission of Inspection made its rounds in Turkestan, it seems 
to have become clear very early on that the Revizuiushchii Senator was not sym-
pathetic either to the “scientific” theories or to the practices of pereselenie in 
Turkestan. Numerous direct or veiled responses to Pahlen’s trenchant criti-
cisms can be traced in the those organs of the local press which supported in-
creased colonization, such as the daily Tashkentskii Kur’er, soon to be renamed 
Turkestanskii Kur’er, which from 1908 was under the editorship of K. A. Timaev, 
a clerk in the local organ of the Directorate for Agriculture and State Properties 
who had been arraigned in court for corruption by the Pahlen commission but 
was subsequently acquitted.99 Attacks on Pahlen can also be found in the pages 
 96 Palen, Pereselencheskoe delo, p. 146.
 97 My thanks to Professor Uyama Tomohiko for alerting me to this – see Happel, Nomadische 
Lebenswelten, pp. 143–145.
 98 See “Proshenie doverennogo ot obshchestve kirgiz Saburovskoi volosti Beksultana” 
(07/10/1908) RGIA, f. 1396, op. 1, d. 256, ll. 169ob http://zerrspiegel.orientphil.uni-halle.de/
t380.html; “Prosheniia Galiia Akhmedovicha Uzbekova” (14/09/1908) RGIA, op. 1, d. 262, 
ll. 38ob http://zerrspiegel.orientphil.uni-halle.de/t790.html; “Prosheniia Tomu Akhinbeko-
va, doverennogo ot naseleniia Dzhanopskoi, Chumyshlinskoi i dr. volostei Pishpekskogo 
uezda” (20/06/1909) RGIA, f. 1396, op. 1, d. 263, ll. 164ob http://zerrspiegel.orientphil.uni-
halle.de/t1105.html; “Proshenie Kirgiz Aulieatinskogo uezda Biikul’skoi volosti No. 7–i, 
Chuike Esengil’dieva i Biktura Bikbulatova” (?/08/1908) RGIA, f. 1396, op. 1, d. 263, ll. 187–
188 http://zerrspiegel.orientphil.uni-halle.de/t1106.html (all accessed 21/06/2011)
 99 T-ov “Turkestanskaia panama,” Birzhevye vedomosti 10730 (1908) in TS 494, p. 81; “Sena-
torskaia Reviziia,” Na Rubezhe Nos. 1, 6–9 (1908) in TS 494, pp. 1–12. I am grateful to Dr 
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of Voprosy Kolonizatsii and other publications of the Pereselencheskoe Upravlenie. 
One defense of the system of expropriating izlishki, published in 1908, used the 
Shcherbina Commission’s report to argue that the land needs of the Kazakhs 
were diminishing in absolute terms as they turned to settled agriculture, and 
that therefore the quantity of land identified as izlishki could be expanded still 
more.100 The agronomist V. I. Iuferev also clearly aimed to counter some of the 
Commission’s criticisms over the inaccuracy of the “norms” in use in Turkes-
tan, noting that between 1906 and 1910 a thorough agricultural survey of the 
Chimkent, Aulie-Ata and Perovsk districts of Syr-Darya Province had been 
completed, together with partial surveys of the Tashkent district, the Osh, Na-
mangan and Andijan Districts of Ferghana Province and parts of Samarkand.101 
In another fairly clear riposte to Pahlen, P. Rumyantsev asserted that the un-
der-developed state of agriculture in Semirechie was not because of the low 
level of culture of the settlers, or because of the inactivity of the Resettlement 
Administration, but owing to the weakness of property rights, which meant 
that neither the nomads who temporarily leased land to settlers, nor the set-
tlers who rented it, had any interest in improving its productivity, but instead 
moved on as soon as it was exhausted.102 Whilst Georgii Gins, one of the lead-
ing young technocrats identified by Holquist, acknowledged that so long as 
Russian peasant settlers considered nomads to be something less than human, 
there was the potential for conflict, he twisted and misrepresented Pahlen’s 
conclusions, blithely asserting that this problem would resolve itself as the set-
tlers began to “raise the cultural level” of the Kazakhs by example.103
However, the heaviest blow was struck in 1909, before the report had 
even been published, when the Pereselencheskoe Upravlenie convened a Com-
mission under Senator Ivanitskii to draw up new regulations for the delin-
eation of lands set aside for colonization in the Steppe Provinces; these were 
then considered alongside an alternative proposal prepared by Pahlen on the 
basis of his researches in Semirechie.104 Evidently outraged by Pahlen’s temer-
ity in questioning the “scientific” basis of colonization policy, the Ivanitskii 
Commission’s counter-arguments often willfully misrepresented his sugges-
tions. Pahlen had proposed that, in addition to protecting their rights of use in 
pasturelands, nomads who had turned to settled agriculture should be granted 
Beatrice Penati for allowing me to cite an unpublished paper which contains more informa-
tion on Timaev and his activities: http://hokudai.academia.edu/BeatricePenati/Talks/24445/
On_the_context_of_Pahlens_report_some_debates_about_land_settlement_and_forestry_
1905–1914_ (accessed 27/06/2011)
 100 D. Fleksor, ed., Pereselencheskoe delo v 1908 godu (St. Pb.: Izd. Pereselencheskago Upravle-
niia, 1908), pp. 29–31.
 101 V. Iuferev, “Agronomicheskiia raboty v Syr-Darinskom Pereselencheskom raione v 1906–
1910 gg.,” VK 8 (1911), p. 270.
 102 P. Rumiantsev “Usloviia kolonizatsiia Semirech’ia,” VK 9 (1911), pp. 223–224.
 103 G. Gins, “Pereselenie i kolonizatsiia chast’ I,” VK 12 (1913), p. 100.
 104 See Brower, Turkestan, pp. 143–145 for another account of its deliberations and outcome.
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full property right over their cultivated plots, and that the practice whereby 
the lands they had already broken in and “brought to life” were designated as 
“izlishki” and used for resettlement should be prohibited. The Ivanitskii Com-
mission claimed that the Pahlen Commission had recommended that only these 
lands should be reserved for the use of the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, without any 
provision for pasture. It rejected any recognition of the ownership rights of the 
nomads in plots they had brought under cultivation, claiming that it would 
be a violation of the Steppe Statute and that it was quite out of the question to 
hand over the best and most productive land in the steppe regions to native 
use as it would render the creation of large plots for resettlement much more 
difficult.105 Pahlen’s ridiculing of the cherished system of “norms” called forth 
the following revealing response:
As for the negative regard of the Senator sent to inspect Turkestan towards 
all types of “normirovanie” of the use of land, the Commission notes that 
all of our land organization policies are based upon these very norms [...] Nor can 
the commission agree with the conclusion of the Inspecting Senator, that the 
current order of defining land not needed (izlishki) by the Kirgiz, is damag-
ing to the latter and of no benefit to the state, finding instead that prolonged 
and broad experience of land distribution works sooner gives us the right to 
come to the opposite conclusion, at least so far as concerns the interests of the 
indigenous population of the Steppe provinces. The introduction of settlers to 
the steppe has brought about the development of agriculture and the culture 
of pastoralism amongst the Kirgiz.106 (emphasis in the original)
The Ivanitskii Commission thus refused even to engage with Pahlen’s ob-
jection that “norms” were meaningless if, as in Semirechie, they were arrived at 
by taking the whole area of a Province and dividing it by the estimated number 
of nomadic households without regard to terrain, hydrography or fertility, and 
if in practice the land designated as “spare” was already under cultivation by 
settled or semi-settled nomads, who were then evicted to make way for set-
tlers. It was equally dismissive of the evidence the Pahlen report provided that 
the settlers were often not economically productive, and were dependent on lo-
cal agricultural expertise. This categorical refusal to accept any of Pahlen’s con-
clusions was fully endorsed by Krivoshein and by the Imperial Senate, which 
ruled that not only would none of the Pahlen Commission’s recommendations 
on pereselenie be applied in the Steppe region, but that the more aggressive pro-
cedures for designating “spare” land which the Pereselencheskoe Upravlenie had 
endorsed instead should also be extended to Semirechie. Finally, the commis-
sion flatly denied that there was a real danger of inter-ethnic tensions boiling 
over in Turkestan: 
 105 “Khronika. Novaia instruktsiia opredeleniia gosudarstvennago zemel’nago fonda v 
stepnykh oblastiakh dlia pereseleniia i drugikh gosudarstvennykh nadobnostei,” VK 6 
(1910), pp. 331–332, 337–340, 343–344.
 106 Ibid., pp. 332–333.
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The Russian people do not destroy other tribes by repopulating their terri-
tory, on the contrary, they strive to bring them civilization and raise their 
well-being. The cruel policy of the Americans towards the Redskins is not 
in the soul of our people and is contrary to their traditions. In colonizing the 
steppe, the Russian Government stands on the footing of right and culture.107 (em-
phasis in the original)
In 1912 Krivoshein would also write that “never and nowhere should 
the well-being of Russian people be founded on the destruction of conquered 
tribes.”108 These breathtaking assertions of the benevolence and exceptionalism 
of Russian imperialism would bear numerous offspring in the Soviet period.109 
Neither then, nor now, were they an adequate description of what the Rus-
sian colonization of Central Asia really meant for those on the receiving end. 
Instead the conclusions of modern historians on the state of relations between 
settlers and nomads in Turkestan in the early 1900s are often strikingly similar 
to Pahlen’s.110
The outbreaks of violence between settlers and the local population which 
Pahlen had warned of were already in evidence before the First World War.111 
In 1916 severe inflation in food prices, high taxation and the conscription ukaz 
issued in August of that year combined with long-standing resentment over 
colonization and expropriation to produce widespread ethnic conflict, most 
particularly in the densely-settled Pishpek and Przheval’sk districts of Semire-
chie, where over 2,000 settlers were killed. For all its shortcomings, even when 
taken in isolation the Pahlen Commission’s volume on Pereselencheskoe Delo in 
Central Asia correctly identified some of the growing ethnic tensions surround-
ing pereselenie, and could be read with profit by many modern historians still 
 107 Ibid., p. 336.
 108 Krivoshein, Zapiska, p. 53.
 109 See, for instance E. M. Brusnikin, “Pereselencheskaia politika Tsarizma v kontse XIX veka,” 
Voprosy istorii 1 (January 1965), pp. 28–38; A. I. Ginzburg, “Pereselentsy i mestnoe nas-
elenie Turkestana v kontse XIX – nachale XX veka,” Voprosy istorii 2 (February 1976), pp. 
201–205.
 110 Peter Weisensel, “Russian-Muslim Inter-ethnic Relations in Russian Turkestan in the Last 
Years of the Empire,” in John Morison, ed., Ethnic and National Issues in Russian and East 
European History: Selected Papers from the Fifth World Congress of Central and East European 
Studies, Warsaw, 1995 (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), pp. 51, 57–59; Buttino, Revo-
liutsiia naoborot, pp. 45–57; Maltusynov, Agrarnyi vopros, pp. 129–137; Pianciola, Stalinismo 
di frontiera, pp. 70–73.
 111 In May 1913, for instance, a group of settlers in the Syr-Darya Province attacked a Kazakh 
aul with stones, killing one woman and severely injuring another. Petition from Kantar-
bai Karimbaev to the Asinskii Uchastkovyi Pristav (01/06/1913) TsGARKaz, f. 433 [Mirovoi 
sud’ia Aulie-Atinskogo uezda], op. 1, d. 287 “Po obvineniiu krestian Kuiukskoi volosti 
Shevchenko, Beznosova, Popova i drugikh v napadenii na aul i za uchastie v drake,” l. 
6ob.
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wedded to the “Druzhby Narodov” version of Russian imperial history.112 When 
combined with the still more pungent allegations of corruption and incompe-
tence in Pahlen’s memoirs, and the large number of petitions from settlers and 
nomads alike from the Pahlen Fond in St Petersburg, it presents a surprisingly 
frank picture both of the general grubbiness and injustice of colonialism,113 and 
more specifically of the disastrous impact of what was perhaps the most “mod-
ern,” ideologically-driven agency of the late-Tsarist state in one of the Empire’s 
most complex, least understood peripheries. 
concLusIon
Pahlen clearly went to his grave in the belief that, despite the turmoil 
which swiftly followed, his Commission had done some good work in Turke-
stan. His memoirs are a litany of abuses exposed and corrupt officials brought 
to justice. Unfortunately no systematic attempt has yet been made to match 
the cases he mentions to trial proceedings in the archives: in the course of my 
own research I came across one successful trial in Samarkand which was initi-
ated by the Revizuiushchii Senator, but it is not mentioned in Pahlen’s memoirs, 
probably because it involved petty corruption by a mere chancery clerk and 
his translator rather than a high-ranking officer or a member of the despised 
Pereselencheskoe Upravlenie.114 Whilst Pahlen and the officials of his Commis-
sion may well have been successful in rooting out individual cases of corrup-
tion, this was meant to be merely the preliminary to the drawing up of a new 
statute and a systematic reform of Turkestan’s administration, and these aims 
remained unfulfilled. 
The volume on Pereselencheskoe Upravlenie is not wholly reliable, of course: 
parts of it simply reproduce verbatim the attitudes of local military officials 
and there is an unevenness of tone which suggests that Pahlen only really got 
 112 See the review of Willard Sunderland’s Taming the Wild Field by V. I. Grachev and O. A. 
Rykin and my response to them in Antropologicheskii Forum 6 (2007), pp. 414–436; See fur-
ther O. I. Brusina, Slaviane v Srednei Azii (Moscow: Vostochnaia Literatura, 2001), pp. 20–40, 
137–147. In this otherwise interesting anthropological work she claims that the violence 
of 1916 was governed more by socio-economic status than by ethnic and linguistic dif-
ferences, reflecting a common unwillingness amongst Soviet-trained scholars to look this 
painful episode squarely in the face. She also avoids discussing this directly in her chapter 
on pereselenie in S. N. Abashin, D. Iu. Arapov & N. E. Bekmakhanova, ed., Tsentral’naia 
Aziia v sostave Rossiiskoi Imperii (Moscow: Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie, 2008), pp. 210–33. 
N. E. Bekmakhanova’s contribution on the 1916 Revolt in the same volume (pp. 288–292) 
has Russian settlers fighting alongside the Kazakhs against the Tsarist regime.
 113 Something also seen in Alexander Kerensky’s passionate denunciation in the Duma of 
the repressive measures undertaken in his native Turkestan after the 1916 revolt. “Takoe 
upravlenie gosudarstvom – nedopustimo. Doklad A. F. Kerenskogo na zakrytom zaseda-
nii Gosudarstvennoi dumy. Dekabr’ 1916 g.,” Istoricheskii arkhiv 2 (1997), pp. 4–22.
 114 Morrison, Russian Rule in Samarkand, p. 161.
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his own way when writing the conclusion – other parts suggest preliminary 
censorship by the Pereselencheskoe Upravlenie and its powerful patrons in St Pe-
tersburg. On the latter front, however, Pahlen’s memoirs are a sufficient cor-
rective, whilst on the former he was able to bring his own observation to bear 
on local prejudices. Pahlen may have known nothing about Islamic law, but he 
knew plenty about agriculture (he had farmed the family estate in Livland for 
ten years) and, perhaps more importantly, about bureaucratic politics.115 The 
petitions his commission received from nomads and settlers, combined with 
their tour of the settlements in Syr-Darya and Semirechie Provinces, allowed 
him to come to some shrewd and accurate conclusions on what proved a di-
sastrously misguided Imperial policy. Whilst he was ignored at the time, his 
interpretation of the impact of peasant colonization on the nomadic population 
of Central Asia has proved remarkably durable.
 115 Pierce, “Introduction,” p. 10.
